

**Salience Matters -
An Innovative Approach to Capturing the Effects of Eurosceptical Attitudes in
Parties and Publics**

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Abstract

The conceptualization of Eurosceptic parties has been a topic of considerable scholarship and intense debate for about 20 years now. Despite these efforts, none of the proposed conceptualizations has as of yet widely been accepted. We argue here that a central weakness of these former approaches is having neglected the actual effects caused by (Eurosceptical) positions of parties. Taking this as our point of departure, we propose a conceptualization which includes the salience political parties attribute to their Eurosceptical attitudes. By this, we are able to distinguish Genuine Eurosceptic parties from mere protest parties. While nearly all protest parties within the EU demonstrate some Eurosceptical positions, only Genuine Eurosceptic parties assign a high degree of salience to such attitudes. Therefore, only in cases of Genuine Eurosceptic parties we would expect to observe a party's Eurosceptical positions to affect the behavior of the party, its voters and other parties.

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Introduction

In the course of our work on an EU FP7 Marie Curie Project, dealing with the question of the determinants of Eurosceptical voting behavior in CEE countries, we are faced with the problem of how to classify a party as Eurosceptic and how to differentiate between Eurosceptic parties and other types of Protest parties as well as Mainstream parties. This paper will focus on this challenge and present our respective suggestions we have developed so far. Before we go on to our main concern, we start with a brief introduction to the project by presenting the empirical puzzle and by outlining the central theoretical argument guiding our work. Afterwards, a short review of existing research on Euroscepticism demonstrates that our suggestion of including salience in the measurement of party-based Euroscepticism is suitable for making a more general contribution to research going beyond the specific use in our project. Afterwards, we present our considerations regarding the conceptualization and operationalization of party-based Euroscepticism. This theoretical discussion is followed by a presentation of the preliminary results the empirical application of our suggested concept to the four countries (Austria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia)¹ covered by our project has produced so far. After discussing what these findings tell us about our empirical puzzle, we will outline how we intend to test our main argument with the help of data collected in citizens' surveys. Finally, we conclude with a short summary of our arguments and findings as well as with a forecast on further research steps.


Public and Party-Based Euroscepticism in Central and Eastern Europe: A Paradoxical Relationship

Only recently, the case of the Finnish party 'True Finns' made obvious once again that Eurosceptic parties are on the increase. In the elections of April 17, 2011, the 'True Finns' were supported by about 19 percent of the Finnish electorate. The Eurosceptical messages the party sent to the voters during the election campaign received great media coverage and concerned political actors on the national as well as the European level. The success of this Eurosceptic party is nevertheless not surprising, as public support of the work of and public trust in the institutions of the European Union declined over the years (or stayed the same at a very low level) in Western Europe (see Eichenberg/ Dalton 2007). By contrast, public support of EU membership as well as trust in EU institutions remained on a comparably high level in

¹ The main criteria applied in selecting these cases is the fact that the Czech Republic, Estonia and Bulgaria have already been investigated in a related project (Zapryanova 2010). Austria serves as a control case to control for hypothesized differences between CEE and Western Europe.

the CEE countries. In addition, in many of these countries, citizens' trust in EU institutions is even higher than in domestic ones. The following graph illustrates these differences in terms of public attitudes towards the European Union between 'Old Europe' and CEE:

Figure 1: Public Attitudes towards the EU



Source: Own calculations based on data provided by Eurobarometer 75, Spring 2011

Against this background, one should assume that Eurosceptic parties are electorally less successful in Central and Eastern European countries than in Western Europe. But the opposite is true as the following tables compiled by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2002: 13; 15) demonstrate:

Table 1: Levels of Party-based Euroscepticism

Country	Hard	Soft	Total
Spain	0	0	0
Italy	0	4.5	4.5
Ireland	0	5.9	5.9
Finland	.8	5.2	6.0
Greece	5.5	2.7	8.3
Germany	3.3	5.1	8.4
Portugal	0	9.0	9.0
Belgium	9.2 ²⁰	0	9.2
Luxembourg	0	13.0	13.0
Netherlands	0	15.9	15.9
Sweden	16.4	5.1	21.5
Austria	0	26.9	26.9
France	26.7	3.7	30.4
UK	2.1	32.4	34.5
Denmark	29.9	7.1	37.0
Average	5.62	9.1	15.37

Country	Hard	Soft	Total
Bulgaria	0	0	0
Slovenia	0.59	4.38	4.97
Lithuania	0	6.94	6.94
Romania	0	19.48	19.48
Latvia	0	27.1	27.1
Estonia	2.43	30.68	33.11
Slovakia	0	36.1	36.1
Poland	18.07	18.48	36.6
Czech Republic	11.0	31.6	42.6
Hungary	9.6	42.0	51.6
Average	4.2	21.7	25.9

Thus, Eurosceptic parties in Central and Eastern Europe obtain a higher cumulative vote share in parliamentary elections than their counterparts in Western Europe. This higher level of party-based Euroscepticism seems to be inconsistent with the respective figures concerning public Euroscepticism. Hence, there exists an empirical puzzle which still has to be solved. Therefore, our research project intends to answer the following question:

What are the determinants of the success of Eurosceptic parties in countries with an overwhelmingly Eurofriendly population?

Following Paul Taggart (1998: 368), we argue that the majority of parties adopting Eurosceptical stances are Protest parties distancing themselves from established parties by using an anti-elite and sometimes even anti-systemic rhetoric. As Taggart states, Protest parties take *'an anti-EU position as an adjunct to their general opposition to the functioning of political systems'* (1998: 368).² Hence, the central argument to be analyzed here is that most of the parties in the Eastern part of the European Union usually labeled 'Eurosceptic' are actually Domestic Protest parties which mainly adopt Eurosceptic positions as a means of differentiating themselves from the Mainstream parties (as the latter have been growing closer together in their programmatic positions and especially in their positions toward the EU). From this point of view, Euroscepticism only represents another element of an overall protest strategy that aims at attracting voters dissatisfied with domestic politics. Thus, we argue that the electoral success of most of these 'Eurosceptic' parties is not due to their Euroscepticism but to the popular dissatisfaction with the actual behavior of Mainstream parties resulting from 1) the (perceived) lack of programmatic differences between the Mainstream parties and 2) the (perceived) underperformance of the Mainstream parties, mainly related to corruption scandals more and more parties in Central and Eastern Europe are involved in.

In order to test our argument we have to show that 1) the parties in Central and Eastern Europe usually labeled Eurosceptic have in fact to be understood as parties essentially trying to capitalize on protest votes against domestic politics but differing from other protest parties in using Euroscepticism to send an additional signal to the electorate that they are different, and that 2) a voting decision in favor of such a party is mainly motivated by attitudes towards domestic politics and not by attitudes towards Europe. Therefore, voting in favor of such a party should be interpreted as a protest vote against domestic poli-

² The connection between Euroscepticism and anti-elitism is also highlighted by the research on populism (e.g., Dezheltes/ Neumayer 2010, Harmsen 2010).

tics rather than a vote against the EU and European integration. By contrast, Genuine Eurosceptic parties are expected to mobilize opposition against Europe.

Before we are able to address our central argument empirically further conceptual and theoretical considerations are required. First, we have to clarify how to distinguish between Genuine Eurosceptic and other Protest parties. As a result, we are in the position to analyze empirically if the so-called Eurosceptic parties in the Central and Eastern European Countries are Genuine Eurosceptic parties or if we are right in assuming them to be actually another subtype of Domestic Protest parties. Second, based on a then established classification scheme of Protest parties we have to develop expectations concerning the determinants of Eurosceptical voting behavior in Central and Eastern Europe.

Salience Matters – A Novel Way of Measuring Party-Based Euroscepticism

Why – in fact – should we distinguish Eurosceptic parties from other parties? Only after answering this question does it make sense to ask as to how such a differentiation can, or should be made. To answer the first question, we submit that it is the actual political behavior of Eurosceptic parties that matters: Specifically, the negative influence they exert in the EU policy cycle and on national decision making toward European integration has, more than anything else, generated such great interest in the scientific community and beyond. However, to be able to say something about effects on European integration, we need information not only about the (Eurosceptical) position of a given party but we also have to consider how relevant this position is for a party. Thus, if we want to measure the impact of a genuinely Eurosceptic party (in contrast to other Protest parties with Eurosceptical positions), we have to show not only that said party exhibits Eurosceptical attitudes but that this position is salient and thus relevant to that party.³ Only in this case, a party's Euroscepticism can be assumed to exert an important influence on a party's behavior, the behavior of other parties and - most important in the context of our research project - on voting behavior. If a party adopts Eurosceptical positions but does not attach much salience to these positions each of these three effects is unlikely to appear.

In the following, a brief review of existing approaches to conceptualizing and measuring party-based Euroscepticism will demonstrate that our suggestion of including salience in this measurement is designed to make a more general contribution to research going beyond the specific use in our project.

³ See Van Spanje (2010) on a related argument. Van Spanje uses the combination of position and salience to identify anti-immigration parties.

Measuring Party-Based Euroscepticism – The State of the Art

When should a political party be labeled ‘Eurosceptic’? This is the central question underlying all empirical scholarship on this subject matter: The distinction between Hard and Soft Euroscepticism introduced by Taggart and Szcerbiak (2002) is still the most influential conceptualization of party-based Euroscepticism and frequently employed in empirical analyses (e.g., the case studies in Taggart/ Szcerbiak 2008). This concept refines the original definition established by Paul Taggart (1998: 366): *‘Euroscepticism expresses the idea of contingent, or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration’*. In order to improve on this rather broad conceptualization and make a distinction between qualified and unqualified opposition, Paul Taggart and Aleks Szcerbiak (2008b: 7-8) developed the abovementioned dichotomy. While Hard Euroscepticism is understood as a *‘principled opposition to the EU and European integration’*, Soft Eurosceptics do not reject the EU and European integration *per se* but take a critical stance on one or more aspects of the current practice of European integration.

Despite having gained widespread acceptance in the research community with their concept, Taggart and Szcerbiak have also been criticized for their conceptualization of Soft Euroscepticism. For example, Peter Kopecký and Cas Mudde (2002: 300) argue that this category is too broad because *‘[...] virtually every disagreement with any policy decision of the EU can be included’*. Drawing on David Easton’s (1965: 124) concept of political support, they suggest instead a four-fold-typology combining diffuse support for European integration and specific support for the EU:

Table 2: Kopecký and Mudde’s Typology of Party-Based Euroscepticism

		Diffuse Support for European integration	
		Europhile	Europhobe
Specific Support for the EU	EU-optimist	Euroenthusiasts	Europragmatists
	EU-pessimist	Eurosceptics	Eurorejects

Source: Authors, based on Kopecký and Mudde 2002

While so-called 'Euroenthusiasts' support the general idea of European integration as well as its current manifestation as embodied by the EU, 'Eurorejects' are opposed to both. By contrast, 'Europragmatists' do not support the general idea of European integration but accept the EU for pragmatic reasons. Finally, the term 'Eurosceptic' is left for those supporting the general idea of European integration while rejecting the current gestalt of the EU. Hence, this last type can be seen as somewhat equivalent to Taggart and Szczerbiak's notion of 'Soft Euroscepticism'.

Nonetheless, several researchers express also reservations about the typology put forth by Kopecký and Mudde. For instance, Timm Beichelt (2004) has objected to this typology on the grounds that diffuse and specific support of European integration would be closely related to one another and should therefore not be listed as distinct categories. Especially, the type of 'Europragmatists' is unlikely to exist in reality, so the argument, because someone opposed to the very idea of Europe would scarcely support the actual practice of European integration. Moreover, Beichelt chides Kopecký and Mudde for restricting the use of the term Euro-skepticism to *'[...] those actors liking the idea but disliking the practice of Europeanisation'*. Instead he proposes to capture the difference between a principled opposition European integration and an opposition to the actual practice of European integration by distinguishing 'Euro-skepticists' from 'EU-skepticists' (Beichelt 2004: 31). Yet, for all his misgivings, Beichelt returns de facto to Taggart and Szczerbiak's dichotomy but proposes yet another new term for distinguishing between different types of opposition to Europe.

Other authors stress the necessity of constructing a typology that is not limited to negative attitudes but covers almost all possible dispositions toward European integration and the EU. Hence, such a typology is said to help to distinguish Eurosceptic parties from non-Eurosceptic parties. For instance, Nicolás Conti and Luca Verzichelli (2002) supplement Taggart and Szczerbiak's dichotomy by adding the category of 'No stances referring to/No interest for European integration' and two variants of positive attitudes, 'Functional Europeanism' and 'Identity Europeanism'. In a similar fashion, Chris Flood and Simon Usherwood (2007: 7) propose a set of seven categories *'[...] based on the degree of support for or opposition to EU integration in general or some specified aspect(s) of it'*, ranging from a rejectionist to a maximalist position. Petr Kaniok (2009) agrees with the notion that one has to consider pro-European attitudes to define party-based Euroscepticism. However, he criticizes the classification of parties who prefer an intergovernmentalist approach of European integration as 'Soft Eurosceptic' and proposes instead a differentiation between the following two types of pro-European attitudes: Europeanists advocating the supranational paradigm and Eurogovernmentalists representing the intergovernmental paradigm. There-

fore, the term 'Euroscepticism' should only be applied to those positions rejecting any kind of political and economic integration.

Another typology of party-based Euroscepticism was introduced by Jan Rovný (2004), which two dimensions reflecting the extent of, and the motivations behind their Euroscepticism. Thus, Rovný's approach goes beyond other concepts in that it is centered on a typology that is not entirely position-based. However helpful for rating parties in terms of their motivations, his typology is of only limited use when predicting the possible effects of a party's Euroscepticism on the behavior of individual and collective actors. Yet, it is arguably this latter aspect that carries important implications for the future development of European integration.

A similar problem plagues those conceptualizations differentiating Euroscepticism according to different respective causes. For example, Catharina Sørensen (2008) distinguishes between utilitarian, sovereignty-based, democratic and social Euroscepticism. In a similar vein, Cécile Leconte (2010) makes a distinction between utilitarian, political, value-based Euroscepticism, and cultural anti-Europeanism. More generally, concepts of Euroscepticism reflecting variations of opposition to European integration in public opinion (e.g. Krouwel/Abts 2007, Weßels 2009) are more subtle and refined than conceptions of party-based Euroscepticism. Yet, also the former have proved difficult to operationalize for the kind of empirical work proposed here.

Concerning the salience of party positions towards Europe, studies analyzing the respective change over time are predominant. Mostly, these studies adjust oneself to Europeanization research and use the national party system as unit of analysis (e. g. Whitefield/ Rohrschneider 2011). In addition, these analyses often do not distinguish between pro- and anti-EU-positions but focus on the salience of EU issues in general in party programs (e. g. Pennings 2006) or election campaigns (e. g. Kriesi 2007). Therefore, the salience of Eurosceptic positions is neither measured systematically nor used as a tool for classifying Eurosceptic parties. The only study applying the latter is the one realized by Staham and Koopmans (2009). But they do not use the overall salience of anti-EU-positions to distinguish Eurosceptic from non-Eurosceptic parties. Instead of this, they make a distinction between Soft and Hard Eurosceptic, or in their words 'Euro-critic', parties according to the share of negative evaluative claims measured via a claims-making-analysis.

As this short literature review reveals, the scholarship thus far has centered on developing sophisticated typologies that can represent the range of (critical) attitudes towards European integration and the EU as accurately as possible. The debate was usually propelled by criticisms of existing concepts and proposals of alternative ways to conceptualize Euroscepticism. Yet, we wonder whether even the most refined typology of attitudes towards Europe can actually tell us something about the effects of these positions. Are we not to assume that the extent of influence a critical attitude exerts on the behavior of an actor increases in proportion to the intensity of expressing this opposition? As a result, we contend that it is not simply the position but rather the salience ascribed to this position by a political actor that drives political behavior. The salience of the position will therefore determine the extent to which attitude translates into behavior. Thus, we propose to supplement existing classifications focusing on parties' positions towards Europe by adding a second dimension: the salience a party attaches to its Euroscepticism. Consequently, our conceptualization does not have to face the 'so what question' which Cas Mudde (2011: 3) discussed only recently by describing salience as 'the Achilles heel of Euroscepticism studies'. The following segment will present our argument in greater detail.

A Novel Approach to Measuring Party-Based Euroscepticism

As we demonstrated in our survey of the literature, the scholarship on the 'Euroscepticism' of parties has almost exclusively focused on a party's positions in order to differentiate between various types of Eurosceptic parties and to distinguish Eurosceptic parties from other types of parties. As already mentioned, we argue that the classification according to a party's position towards Europe should be supplemented by considering also the salience a party attaches to this position. In particular, such a conceptualization will be highly useful if research aims at investigating causes or consequences of the electoral success of Eurosceptic parties, as it is the case in our research project. In the following, we will demonstrate hypothetically that a party's positions and the salience of these positions are of distinct explanatory power when it comes to accounting for the effect of party-based Euroscepticism on electoral behavior, party behavior, and changes in the party system as a whole. As such, three levels should be distinguished in the analysis of the effects of party behavior: The level of the party and its 'individual' behavior, the level of the electorate (which is also affected by the behavior of the party), and the level of the party system (which can also be influenced by the actions of an individual party).

Starting with the first level, we conclude that knowing the position of a party on a given issue suggests something about the behavior of that party when having to make political decisions on the subject matter in question. However, as is evident, a party's position might be in contradiction to another position held by the same party.⁴ How then can we therefore predict which of these contradicting positions is more likely to determine the party's behavior in the decision-making process? Furthermore, in most European countries, parties govern in coalitions. As such, being part of a coalition requires giving up on some positions to be able to prevail on other ones. Coalition parties are constantly forced to engage in policy tradeoffs and make political choices. Thus, when knowing only the positions of a party, we would be unable to explain which ones will be acted upon in the context of coalition politics and which not. However, knowing the salience parties attribute to their respective positions does enable us to predict the actual behavior of these parties. This is because we assume parties to be rational actors and as such they are unlikely to give up on a position which matters to them. Arguably, this becomes even more evident when we consider the reasons of why parties get elected. The electorate reacts not only to a party's positions on a given issue but also the salience of this position because voters correctly assume parties to act on those issues about which they really care. Thus, voters judge parties by the words *and* deeds attached to the political positions presented in electoral campaigns.

These days most of the central political goals such as fighting unemployment, bringing the national finances in order, securing public services, and addressing environmental issues are not fundamentally disputed by anybody in the political arena. However, when it comes to adopting the means necessary for attaining these ends, parties face contradictions they must resolve — e. g., the need for reducing the deficit conflicts with maintaining a high level of social services. These difficult choices are made easier for parties in that they attach varying degrees of salience to these issues, very much the same way voters do.⁵ Thus, an individual will exhibit a voting preference in the order by which the relevance attributed to a position by a party matches his or her own.⁶ Naturally, voters will act on a party's position and demonstrated salience — that is a party's commitment — only if it is clearly communicated vis-à-vis the elec-

⁴ Assume in a very simplified example that a social democratic party sees one of its main tasks in protecting the working class. However, this may conflict with the goal of promoting economic prosperity. How should we then predict party behavior in preference conflicts if we only know the party's positions?

⁵ Concerning the role of salience in party competition, see especially Klingemann et al. 1994, Budge 2001, Laver 2001, Volkens 2001, Pelizzo 2003, Franzmann and Kaiser 2006.

⁶ Related to the discussion on salience is the debate about the directional versus proximity model of voting. The directional model is based on the assumption that different degrees of issue salience between parties can be distinguished: See Lacy and Paolino 2010, Hinich et al. 2004, Westholm 2001, Merrill and Grofman 1999, MacDonald et al. 1998, 1991, MacDonald and Rabinowitz 1997, Rabinowitz and MacDonald 1989.

torate — this assumes, of course, that only a relatively small minority of the electorate will acquaint itself with a party's programs in any detail independent of the party's ability to communicate effectively. This brings us to our final and crucial point: It is the success of a *salient* position in an election or public poll *and* the actions taken on this *salient* position that structure the direction and nature of the competition in national party systems — the third level of our analysis. Therefore, parties with critical attitudes towards Europe can affect national or European decision-making concerning European integration if they are able to 1) prevail with their Eurosceptical positions in coalitions, 2) achieve success in elections by adopting Eurosceptical stances, and 3) alter the behavior of other political actors (most likely as a result of the former two points), who react in kind to the Eurosceptic challenger. However, the different effects described here are only plausible if Eurosceptical positions are indeed *salient* (to them) and not merely token positions.⁷ Hence, we argue that Genuine Eurosceptic parties differ from other parties not only in terms of their position towards Europe but mainly *in terms of the degree of salience these parties attach to their Eurosceptical positions*. To put it in a nutshell, salience makes all the difference.

As already mentioned, we follow Paul Taggart (1998: 368) by arguing that Euroscepticism is an additional means used by protest parties to distance themselves from established parties. When applying this insight to our argument here, we conclude that the group of protest parties is neither homogenous nor monolithic but in fact rather varied in terms of the degree of salience they attribute to Euroscepticism. Therefore, we propose to distinguish not only Genuine Eurosceptic parties from mainstream parties but also from other protest parties (see esp. Galina Zapryanova 2010).

In addressing the question of what distinguishes Genuine Eurosceptic parties from other parties, we identify two fundamental dimensions of protest politics, the first of which may be labeled 'Nationalist Populism'. It contains policy proposals or statements connected to authoritarian, nationalist, and nativist positions, whose focus is squarely placed on domestic politics.⁸ To the extent that most Protest parties belong to the so-called New Populist Right or the New Right, it is the domestic nature of their concerns that is really at the heart of their political agenda.⁹ The second dimension of protest may be labeled 'Eu-

⁷ That EU issues are, in national party competition, increasingly salient in their own right has been shown, for example, by Netjes and Binnema 2007, Steenbergen and Scott 2004, Pennings 2006 as well as Whitefield and Rohrschneider 2011.

⁸ Unfortunately, we have no data at hand enabling us to use classical populism indicators like references to an elite-mass-cleavage etc. That's the reason why we are forced to measure populism with indicators that would be more appropriate for measuring a party's stance on nationalism or authoritarianism.

⁹ Many Green or new politics parties initially belonging to the spectrum of protest parties have already moved into the political mainstream.

roscepticism' as it contains policy proposals or statements skeptical of European integration in general and the European Union in particular.¹⁰ Based on these two dimensions of protest — domestic and Euro-sceptic — three types of protest parties are hypothetically possible: Nationalist Protest Party, Genuine Eurosceptic Party, and Mixed Protest Party (cf. Galina Zapryanova 2010).

In the last case a party chooses to embrace both protest dimensions by adopting a mixed approach. It follows from our earlier analysis, that we may differentiate protest parties from the mainstream parties in that the latter are unlikely to ascribe much salience to either Eurosceptical or nationalist populist positions. That is, we do not assume mainstream parties to exhibit Eurosceptical or nationalist populist *positions* at all. In the unlikely event they do so, we expect them to assign only a marginal relevance to such positions.

With regard to differentiating the three subtypes of Protest parties from each other, two qualifications have to be made to refine our argument: First, we accept the premise that probably all of the Protest parties found in European party systems actually exhibit Eurosceptical as well as nationalist populist positions (see de Vries and Edwards 2009).¹¹ As mentioned in the review of the literature, this has caused some stir among scholars over whether a certain party ought to be classified as Hard or Soft Eurosceptic, etc. By contrast, we argue that it is not the *position* of a party per se but rather the *salience* attributed to a position that enables us to differentiate between divergent party types within the spectrum of protest parties. Second, as a consequence of our main point, we argue that one has to distinguish the aforementioned three types of protest parties: Nationalist Protest, Mixed Protest, and Genuine Eurosceptic parties. Consequently, Genuine Eurosceptic parties are characterized by a high degree of salience attributed to Eurosceptical positions *in combination* with low levels of salience given to nationalist populist positions (if demonstrating such positions at all). By contrast, Nationalist Protest parties attribute a high degree of salience to nationalist populist positions *and* a low degree of salience to Eurosceptical positions


¹⁰ Note that we do not distinguish between different forms of Euroscepticism but only between pro- and anti-EU-positions. There are two reasons for this simplification: First, and foremost, in our view the crucial difference between Genuine Eurosceptic and other parties is not the position but the salience so that it is not necessary to make such a fine distinction between positions. Second, we are interested in an operationalization for undertaking quantitative research on the subject matter. In this regard, the Chapel Hill data set as the currently most often applied quantitative data source also allows only for such simple distinctions (see Hooghe et al. 2010, and Marks et al. 2007).

¹¹ The correlation of nationalism and left-wing populist parties is evident in the example of the German 'PDS/Die Linke', Especially one of its former party leaders, Oskar Lafontaine, has, while of office, frequently referred to the German 'Volk' (folk) as being dominated by a governing elite (Bergsdorf 2008: 45) and to the German social welfare system as endangered by 'Fremdarbeiter' (foreign workers) (Hartleb 2007).

(if demonstrating such positions at all). Mixed Protest parties demonstrate an equal degree of salience toward Eurosceptical as well as nationalist populist positions.

The classification of party types based on the salience of the parties' respective positions on the 'Euro-sceptic' and the 'Nationalist Populist' dimensions is depicted below in Figure 2. One should note that all Protest parties differ from Mainstream parties in the high levels of salience they attribute both to nationalist populist *and* to Eurosceptical positions (this is true even in those rare cases where mainstream parties do show some Eurosceptical or nationalist populist positions).

Figure 2: Distinctions between Hypothetical Party Types by Protest Dimension and Salience



Source: Authors

With regard to the effects of a party's Euroscepticism on the three levels mentioned above we hypothesize striking differences between Genuine Eurosceptic parties and the two other subtypes of protest parties. That is the reason why we advocate classifying only those parties as Eurosceptic that can be expected to translate their critical position towards Europe into behavior and, therefore, to affect voting behavior as well as the strategic interaction with and between other parties:

Table 3: Predicted Effects of Types of Protest Parties

Level	Party Type	Effect
Party Behavior	Nationalist Protest	Eurosceptical attitudes do not translate into behavior
	Mixed Protest	
	Genuine Eurosceptic Party	Voting against further integration steps in national and European decision making process and direct communication of Eurosceptical positions vis-à-vis electorate
Party Competition	Nationalist Protest	No response of other parties to the party's Euroscepticism
	Mixed Protest	
	Genuine Eurosceptic Party	Response of other parties to the party's Euroscepticism in terms of change in positions towards Europe and increased salience attributed to EU issues
Voting behavior	Nationalist Protest	Voting decision in favor of the party not due to the party's Euroscepticism but due to dissatisfaction with domestic politics
	Mixed Protest	
	Genuine Eurosceptic Party	Voting decision in favor of the party due to its Euroscepticism: EU issue voting

In the following section, we will briefly discuss how to apply our typology and present our respective preliminary results.

Method, Operationalization and Preliminary Results

To integrate the salience of positions of political actors into the analysis might be a new approach to the research on Euroscepticism, however, it has been a rather traditional approach to other parts of party research (see Helbling/Tresch 2011, Marks et al. 2007, Netjes/Binnema 2007, Ray 2007, Whitefield et al. 2007). Thus, we have several databases at hand which enable us to analyze the positional stance of a party as well as the salience it ascribes to its stances on several issue dimensions. We decided to give

preference to the Chapel Hill Data Set instead of Manifesto Data for the following reasons: First, the manifestos are coded by single coders – and the reliability values presented by both data sets, the Euromanifesto as well as the Comparative Manifesto Project data, are not as high as one would (and should) expect (see Braun et al. 2010). Second, the Comparative Manifesto Project data set lacks data for more recent national elections, so we would have to deal, for example, with the positions of Austrian parties which are approximately ten years old. This might raise important validity issues. Third, the Euromanifesto data measures the positions of parties presented by parties in advance to the European Parliaments elections. This might not only overestimate the salience parties ascribe to European (or Euro-sceptic) issues, but also results in some problems concerning the source of the manifesto estimations. That is, the positions of the Liste Hans-Peter Martin had to be measured by analyzing a single flyer, resulting in a low-number-problem. This again leads to fuzzy estimations of party positions and their salience (measured as a relation to the overall number of problems identified) highly probable. Consequently, we base the empirical application of our typology on Chapel Hill Data although we are aware of the constraints expert surveys are faced with - the question of who evaluates national parties on which dimensions and by which categories. Despite all these weaknesses and the differences of measurement between the three datasets, it turns out that (on a fundamental level) the estimates are comparable over the datasets (see on these comparability checks especially Ray 2007, but also Whitefield et al. 2007, Marks et al. 2007). That is, the measurements of the position of a party on a Eurosceptic and a nationalist populist dimension as well as the salience the parties ascribe to their positions on these dimensions are pointing in the same direction in the Chapel Hill survey as well as in the Euromanifesto data.¹² We are therefore confident that using the Chapel Hill survey to calculate the positions and salience values to be used in the remainder of the paper results in a reliable and valid measurement. Nevertheless, we control for the measurements by the Euromanifesto data and will discuss differences between both measurements in the case such differences actually appear.

To determine the actual image which parties want to project regarding the domestic populist and the Eurosceptic dimension, we follow a two-step procedure. First, we identify the actual position parties take on the 'Nationalist Populist' and on the 'Eurosceptic' dimension by using the Chapel Hill data.¹³ While the position on 'Euroscepticism' is very straightforward (experts were asked to evaluate the 'general po-

¹² For example, when turning to the salience party ascribe to their position on the populist dimension and distinguishing between lower and higher degrees of salience, both measurements overlap in 82% of the cases.


¹³ Note that the Hungarian party 'Jobbik' has not been included into the Chapel Hill survey of 2006. We therefore implemented its values by using the measurement of the Euromanifesto survey where it actually has been included. We are confident in estimating these values correctly as both datasets – as has been already shown – overlap to a large degree.

sition on the European integration that the party leadership took', Q1), we had to calculate the parties' position on 'Nationalist Populism' by taking four issues into account (led by the literature on populism, see especially Dechezelles/Neumayer 2010, also: Hooghe/Marks/Wilson 2002; critically: Harmsen 2010). We added the positions of a party on all four issues and divided the resulting value by four. The issues involved contain question for the party's stance on civil liberties vs. law and order (Q19), its support for or opposition toward liberal policies (Q21), its opposition toward or support for tough immigration policies (Q25) as well as its advocacy for cosmopolitanism or nationalism (Q31). These variables were always ranging from 0 to 10 in the directions implied by the variable description above.

However, we are more interested in the salience the parties ascribe to these dimensions. Thus, we calculated the salience the parties assign to both of these issue dimensions by using the salience measurement variables included in the Chapel Hill survey (Euro-scepticism: Q2, Nationalist Populism: (Q20+Q22+Q26+Q32)/4). However, as the scale of these measurements differed (Euro-scepticism 1-4, Nationalist Populism: 0-10), we centered these measurement relative to their mean to make them compatible. Then, to still indicate within the salience distribution whether parties show non-populist or populist positions, we simplified the position by only differentiating between parties not adopting Euro-sceptical or Nationalist Populist positions (= -1), adopting such positions (= 1), or being undecided about it (= 0).¹⁴ Finally, we multiplied the respective position measures with the salience measures (that is Euro-scepticism_pos*Euro-scepticism_sal, etc.). The resulting value includes the (crude) position and (dominantly) the salience a party ascribes toward its stance on the respective issue dimension. As we coded the position only as positive, negative, or undecided, the *largeness of the value reflects the salience a party attributes* to its positive or negative stance on the issue. Graph 3 shows the distribution of both Euro-sceptical as well as Nationalist populist attitudes of the parties analyzed here. Note again that a party's attitude in favor of 'Euro-scepticism' or 'Nationalist Populism' (which is normally normatively associated with negative values) is coded positively here, while attitudes against Euro-scepticism or nationalist populism (in the latter case, libertarian values etc.) are coded negatively.

¹⁴ We ascribed the value 0 only to these parties, whose position ranges between 4.5 to 5.5 that is around the center value on the 0-10 scale.

Figure 3: Salience of Party Attitudes on ‘Euroscepticism’ and ‘Nationalist Populism’



Source: Authors


What does Figure 3 tell us? Concerning our main interest, the distinction between different types of protest parties, it can be observed, that Eurosceptical attitudes seem only in two cases to be more salient to protest parties than ‘Nationalist populist’ issues: LHM and the Polish Samoobrona. And even in the case of these two parties, we might distinguish between a clear ‘Genuine Eurosceptic party’ in the case of LHM and a ‘Mixed Protest party’ in the case of Samoobrona. The difference here lies not only in the diverging positions the LHM takes on the two dimensions, but also in the different degrees of salience the party attributes to issues on these dimensions. While the position on the ‘Nationalist populist’ dimension is only half as salient as its position on the ‘Euroscepticism’ dimension to the LHM, the opposite is true in case of Samoobrona. In the latter case, the Eurosceptical position is only a little more salient to the party than its position on the populist dimension. Similar to Samoobrona, but in reversed order, Jobbik, PiS, KDH, KSS, but also SNS, FPÖ, BZÖ and LPR are cases that we classified as Mixed Protest parties. Finally, four parties can be identified as Nationalist Protest parties: FIDESZ, KDNP, LS-HZDS, and SMER. To illustrate this categorization in an even more obvious way, we calculated another variable which is also based on the salience values in Figure 3. The new variable measures the degree of salience attributed to

one issue dimension in relation to the other dimension. The formula used here follows conventional methods to demonstrate relative values and might be visualized in the following way:

$$Sal_{rel} = \frac{Sal_{EU} - Sal_{NatPop}}{Sal_{EU} + SAL_{NatPop}}$$

where Sal_{EU} is the amount of salience attributed to the Euroscepticism-dimension and Sal_{NatPop} is the amount of salience attributed to the Nationalist Populism dimension. The resulting variable Sal_{rel} ranges from +1 (only EU-Dimension is salient to party) to -1 (only Nationalist Populist-Dimension is salient to party), taking the value 0 if both dimension are equally salient to the party. The results of this calculation are plotted in Figure 4 and strongly encourage the categorization we have previously undertaken.¹⁵

Figure 4: Relative Distribution of Salience toward both Dimensions



Therefore, the first step in our empirical analysis seems to support our theoretical argument: All parties in the three CEE countries covered by our project that are usually classified as Eurosceptic parties attribute only a relatively low degree of salience to their Euroscepticism. In fact, most of the parties in question are Mixed Protest Parties. The only Genuine Eurosceptic Party can be found in Austria. The following table summarizes our findings and compares our classifications with previous categorizations exclusively dealing with parties' positions:

¹⁵ Note that we excluded the value for the salience of the Domestic Politics-Dimension for the Liste Hans-Peter Martin. This has been done due to the position the LHM takes on this dimension which is not at all populist and should therefore not be included into the calculation of the salience of populist positions on two dimensions.

Table 4: Our Findings Compared with Previous Classifications of Eurosceptic Parties

Country	Party	Our classification	Taggart / Szczerbiak 2008b	Kopecký / Mudde 2002	Beichelt 2004	Other classifications
Austria	FPÖ	<i>Mixed Protest</i>	Soft Euroscepticism	-----	-----	-----
	BZÖ	<i>Mixed Protest</i>	-----	-----	-----	-----
	Liste Hans Peter Martin	<i>Genuine Eurosceptic</i>	-----	-----	-----	-----
Hungary	Fidesz	<i>Nationalist Protest</i>	Soft Euroscepticism	Euroenthusiast	EU-skepticist	-----
	Jobbik	<i>Mixed Protest</i>	-----	-----	-----	Hard Euroscepticism (Batory 2010)
Poland	Samoobrona	<i>Mixed Protest</i>	Hard Euroscepticism	Euroreject	Euro-skepticist	-----
	LPR	<i>Mixed Protest</i>	Hard Euroscepticism	Euroreject	Euro-skepticist	-----
	PiS	<i>Mixed Protest</i>	Soft Euroscepticism	Eurosceptic	EU-skepticist	-----
	PSL	<i>Mixed Protest</i>	Soft Euroscepticism	Euroenthusiast	EU-skepticist	-----
Slovakia	KSS	<i>Mixed Protest</i>	Hard Euroscepticism	-----	Euro-skepticist	-----
	SNS	<i>Mixed Protest</i>	Hard Euroscepticism	Euroreject	Euro-skepticist	-----
	Smer	<i>Nationalist Protest</i>	Soft Euroscepticism	-----	-----	-----
	HZDS	<i>Nationalist Protest</i>	Soft Euroscepticism	Europragmatist	EU-skepticist	-----
	KDH	<i>Mixed Protest</i>	Soft Euroscepticism	Eurosceptic	-----	-----

Thus, in the next step we have to predict the effects of the different party types on voting behavior in order to test our theoretical argument and to offer a solution to the empirical puzzle described above.

Determinants of Eurosceptical Voting Behavior in CEE Countries

In addition to showing that the so-called Eurosceptic parties in the CEE Countries are in fact Mixed or Nationalist Protest Parties we have to demonstrate that a voting decision in favor of such a party is mainly motivated by attitudes towards domestic politics and not by attitudes towards Europe. In our opinion, the identification of determinants of voting behavior requires not only investigating individual attitudes but also considering the salience voters attach to different issues. This assumption is justified by the reflection that vote decisions will be only influenced by individual attitudes towards a given issue, if this issue is relevant to voters. Thus, we have to show that voters dissatisfied with the positions and the performance of mainstream parties will be more likely to vote for the Nationalist or Mixed Protest Parties, if EU issues are only marginally salient to them. By contrast, voters with a high degree of Eurosceptical feelings and a high salience toward European issues should be more likely to vote for the Genuine Eurosceptic Parties. In the case of voters showing a high degree of dissatisfaction with Mainstream parties and Eurosceptic attitudes but a low salience of European issues, we argue that these voters (due to the higher salience of domestic issues) are more likely to vote for Nationalist or Mixed Protest Parties. Finally, voters showing positive feelings toward the Mainstream parties and Eurosceptical attitudes but a low salience of European issues should (also due to the higher salience of domestic issues) be more likely to vote for Mainstream parties. Our expected effects might then be summarized as follows:

Table 5: Expected Effects on Voting Behavior

Dissatisfaction with behavior of Mainstream parties (measured as interaction of perceived party similarity and corruption)	Eurosceptic attitudes	Salience of EU issues to voter	Voter is likely to vote for
Yes	Yes	High	Genuine Eurosceptic party
		Low	Domestic / Mixed populist party
No	Low		
No	Yes	High	Genuine Eurosceptic party
		Low	Mainstream party
	No	Low	

These expectations will be tested with the help of data collected in citizens' surveys that will be conducted in the four countries (Austria, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) covered by our project. Our dependent vari-

able is conceptualized in two ways: First, we create a nominal scaled variable distinguishing the voters of Genuine Eurosceptic parties (=1) from voters of Nationalist/ Mixed Protest parties (=2) and voters of Mainstream parties (=3). This variable will then be used in a multinomial regression, testing our hypotheses (which are plotted below). Second, to test the appropriateness of the multinomial regression we re-code our dependent variables in two dummy variables: vote pro/contra Genuine Eurosceptic parties, vote pro/contra Nationalist/ Mixed Protest parties. As it is then possible to analyze our hypotheses with binary logistic regression methods, we are not only able to test the likelihood to vote for one party type in contrast to vote for another party type but also to control for the likelihood to vote for one party type in contrast to the likelihood to vote for any other party. The hypotheses which guide our research might then be stated in the following way:

Table 6: Hypotheses

H 1	Citizens who perceive a higher degree of mainstream party similarity and of political corruption will be more likely to vote for Nationalist/ Mixed Protest parties than for Mainstream parties.
H 2a	Citizens who have less favorable views of EU membership or European integration and attribute a <i>high</i> salience to European issues will be more likely to vote for Genuine Eurosceptic parties than for Mainstream parties.
H 2b	Citizens who have less favorable views of EU membership or European integration and attribute a <i>high</i> salience to European issues will be more likely to vote for Genuine Eurosceptic parties than for Nationalist/ Mixed Protest parties.
H 3a	Citizens who perceive a higher degree of mainstream party similarity and of political corruption, have less favorable views of EU membership or European integration and attribute a <i>low</i> salience to European issues will be more likely to vote for Nationalist/ Mixed Protest parties.
H 3b	Citizens who perceive a lower degree of mainstream party similarity and of political corruption, have less favorable views of EU membership or European integration and attribute a <i>low</i> salience to European issues will be more likely to vote for Mainstream parties.

The voters' "dissatisfaction with the behavior of Mainstream parties" will be operationalized as the perception of positional similarity between Mainstream parties and the perception of the degree of political corruption of the main political parties. The degree of "Eurosceptical attitudes" will be captured by a scale variable, which contains the voter's position with regard to the general position on European integration (according to the Chapel Hill Survey reaching from strongly in favor to strongly opposed) and the trust in the European Union. The salience of attitudes towards Europe will be measured by the degree of

importance a respondent attributes to the problem of 'The loss of decision-making power and erosion of national identity after entry into the EU' in relation to other problems facing the country at the present. We will also control for age, gender, income, education as well as religiosity (but not for denomination, see for such analysis Minkenberg 2009, Boomgarden and Freire 2009), ideological position as well as attitudes towards minorities and populist attitudes. In addition, we intend to control for agreement between each party's profile in terms of position on and salience of the two protest dimensions and the voters' respective perception of a given party.

Conclusion

The main concern of our paper was to present a novel way of measuring party-based Euroscepticism. We argue that drawing on the concept of salience allows us to predict the effects a party's critical position towards Europe have on political outcomes and on the behavior of individual and collective actors. As such, it is not only necessary to know what parties want, that is the position they adopt, but also to what lengths they are willing to go to attain these goals, which is reflected in how salient a position is for a given party. Hence, our proposition supplements existing conceptual work based on parties' positions by adding a second dimension and is especially suitable for empirical research aiming to analyze the success and the effects of parties critical towards Europe.

Our research project addresses one of these aspects by seeking to explain the success of so-called Eurosceptic parties in CEE countries which is particularly surprising against the background of relative low levels of public Euroscepticism in this region. We hope to solve this empirical puzzle by arguing that these parties are electorally successful not due to their Euroscepticism but due to the voters' dissatisfaction with domestic politics. In a first step, we were able to demonstrate that the parties in question are in fact Mixed or Nationalist Protest parties attributing to its Euroscepticism only minor relevance. In a second step, we will test our hypotheses concerning voting behavior with the help of survey data. We expect to discover that 'Eurosceptical' voting behavior in CEE countries expresses in fact protest against domestic politics instead of rejection of European integration. Thus, voting in favor for so-called Eurosceptic parties in CEE can be assumed to be not 'Eurosceptical' in the true sense.

In addition, our conceptualization can be used as starting point for further empirical research. The following questions are of particular interest: Why, for example, do some parties that are clearly dissatis-

fied with domestic conditions and critical of Mainstream party performance nevertheless embrace Euro-sceptical positions while others maintain a national-populist profile? How are we to explain the Mixed Protest type as this might represent perhaps some form of seeking multiple goals? Do parties within national party systems actually react in ways we have theorized? These are the questions we intend to explore by using salience as main explanatory variable and by which we hope to make a substantive contribution to the scholarship on Euroscepticism.

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