Wintersemester


Kurse auf English  

VO und UE What is rational belief? (Julien Murzi, 8 ECTS)
SE Perception (Christopher Gauker, 6 ECTS)
SE The cognitive foundations of fiction (Johannes Brandl und Josef Perner, 6 ECTS)
SE The aims of scientific metaphysics (Iulian Toader, 6 ECTS)
SE Climate ethics (Iulian Toader, 6 ECTS)
SE Colloquium seminar (Christopher Gauker, 2 ECTS)    

Kurse auf Deutsch

VO Die Philosophie von Leibniz (Jürgen Mittelstraß, 4 ECTS)
SE Wissenschaftstheorie und Wissenschaftsgeschichte (Jürgen Mittelstraß, 6 ECTS)
UV Sprachphilosophie (Pascale Lötscher, 4 ECTS)
SE Ausgewählte Themen der Angewandten Ethik (Alexander Hieke, 4 ECTS)  

Sommersemester

Kurse auf Englisch

VO und UE Vagueness (Julien Murzi, 8 ECTS)
SE Categories: their nature, heuristics and importance (Peter Simons, 6 ECTS)
SE Philosophy of climate Science (Charlotte Werndl, 6 ECTS)
SE Ethics: theoretical and applied (Christian Piller, 6 ECTS)
UV Theories of collective decision making (Laurenz Hudetz, 4 ECTS)
SE Colloquium seminar (Charlotte Werndl, 2 ECTS)
SE Masterseminar (Charlotte Werndl, 2 ECTS)   

Kurse auf Deutsch


UV Locke über den menschlichen Verstand (Christopher Gauker, 4 ECTS)
SE Kontexte in der formalen Semantik (Christopher Gauker, 6 ECTS)
VO Politische Philosophie (Leonhard Menges, 4 ECTS)
SE Ethische Interventionen (Georg Meggle, 6 ECTS)

Kurse auf Deutsch und Englisch

SE Colloquium seminar (Charlotte Werndl, 2 ECTS)

  

Kurze Lehrveranstaltungsbeschreibung (nur für Lehrveranstaltungen in englischer Sprache)  


wintersemester

Julien Murzi: What is rational belief? 

We typically value justified belief more than simple belief: after all, a justified belief is more likely to be true than a randomly selected one. Indeed, we value knowledge even more than justified belief, since, arguably, a belief that qualifies as knowledge is true. But when is a belief justified? Does our justification for a proposition depend on its likelihood to be true given our evidence? Can we rationally have inconsistent beliefs, such as the belief that no particular lottery ticket in a fair lottery will win? What is justification? And what is knowledge? Can it be defined? Is knowledge a particular kind of sensitive, or safe, belief? Do we know anything at all? Do you know that your cat is sleeping on the sofa, if you don't know that you're not a brain in a vat? Could we even understand the language of somebody whose brain was envatted, by an evil scientist, or malin génie? In this course, we'll investigate these and other epistemological questions, mostly by looking at some deeply puzzling sceptical arguments, some of which are probably as old as Philosophy is, and all of which have sprung very lively debates in the recent philosophical literature.

Christopher Gauker: Perception

What is the relation between a perception (e.g. visual or auditory) and what it represents? This is one of the mostly hotly debated questions in contemporary philosophy of mind. Do our perceptions represent objects as belonging to kinds (e.g., pine tree)? If so, which kinds can perceptions represent? If not, in what sense can perceptions be either accurate or inaccurate, and how do perceptions communicate with the rest of our thoughts? After introducing the basic concepts and issues, this course will focus on two topics: First, to what extent and in what ways can our perceptual representations be affected by our beliefs and other cognitions (the problem of cognitive penetration)? Do our perceptions depend, for intance, constitutively on our concepts? Second, in what way can our perceptions guide our thoughts? Shall we say, for instance, that perceptions justify beliefs, or is the guidance of some other kind? In connection with this latter question, we will also explore the semantics of “looks” sentences, as in “That fruit looks ripe”. Do such statements express the contents of perceptions, or is their relation to perception less direct?

Johannes Brandl und Josef Perner: The cognitive foundations of fiction

When we invent stories, engage in counterfactual reasoning, or imagine a possible future that may never come about, we think about fictional scenarios. The cognitive abilities that enable us to do so are of interest to both philosophers and psychologists. In this seminar, we want to bring these interests together and discuss some of the recent literature on how we create fictional scenarios in our minds. Starting from classical works by K. Walton (Mimesis as Make-Belief, 1990) and P.L. Harris (The Work of the Imagination, 2000), we will discuss among others the following topics: Which representational processes are involved in creating fictional scenarios? Does pretending depend on a distinctive attitude of imagination? How do children develop a sense of “nearest possible worlds”? How can we explain phenomena like imaginative resistance? Why is understanding what someone pretends to be the case so much easier for children than understanding what someone believes? How can thoughts about nonexisting entities be naturalized, e.g., captured with mental files?

Iulian Toader: The Aims of Scientific Metaphysics

Traditional criticisms consider metaphysics deficient insofar as it prevents cognitive progress or because it lacks theoretical content. More recently,  metaphysics has been judged deficient  for its lack of scientific standing. To overcome this latter deficiency, one typically requires that metaphysical views be continuous and harmonious with science, that they be tied into the results and practices of science. This seminar will analyze and evaluate such requirements. Students will become familiar with the historical and  conceptual motivations for the project of scientific metaphysics, its goals and limitations. We will follow the development of this project since the beginning of the 20th century, but will mostly focus on recent arguments.

Iulian Toader: SE Climate ethics 

Major climate changes, such as the increase of global temperatures due to accummulation of carbon dioxide in the air and the rise of global average sea level, as well as their undeniable harmful consequences, have called for transformations of both technology and human behavior. Mitigation based on emission cuts has been the main focus of our response strategies to keep global warming as far below under 2ºC as possible. This seminar will consider the moral questions raised by these strategies. In particular, we will discuss questions about fairness in sharing the associated economic burden among countries, questions about justice towards climate refugees, future generations, and non-human species, as well as questions related to what, if anything, each and every one of us is morally obligated to do in the face of imminent dangerous climate changes.

Christopher Gauker: Colloquium seminar

Christopher Gauker: SE Master seminar  


sommersemester

Julien Murzi: Vagueness

One grain of sand doesn’t make a heap. But if n grains of sand don’t make a heap, neither do n + 1 grains of sand. But then, by repeated applications of modus ponens, it follows — absurdly — that 1.000.000 grains of send don’t make a heap either! This is the Sorites Paradox. The paradoxes arises because of the tolerance of the great majority of natural language predicates: i.e. predicates such as ‘heap’, ‘red’, ‘child’, ‘happy’ are such that if they apply to an object o at all, then they also apply to an object that every so slightly differs from o in the relevant respect. Given tolerance, and a tiny bit of logic, we can prove all kinds of absurd conclusions, such that a 58 year old man is a toddler, that 0 grains of sand make a heap, and so on. Does this show that natural languages are inconsistent, or even incoherent? Or does the phenomenon of vagueness point to the need for a much more sophisticated understanding of an apparently simple, if inconsistent, phenomenon? And how are we to decide how to best account for vague predicates? Can empirical evidence be brought to bear on the question how to solve the Sorites Paradox and how to interpret vague predicates? In this course, we shall be looking at various different ways of understanding vagueness and various proposed treatments, old and new, of Sorites Paradoxes. We will be addressing questions such as: What is the source of vagueness? Is vagueness semantic, or can the world be inherently vague? Can vagueness be eliminated? What is the logic of vagueness? What is higher-order vagueness and is it a coherent notion? Does the Sorites Paradox rest on illicit shifts of context? Can empirical evidence adjudicate between different competing accounts of vagueness? Can there be vague objects?

Peter Simons: Categories. Their Nature, Heuristics and Importance

Since Aristotle’s early logical work Categories the concept of a category has played a crucial role in numerous areas of philosophy: ontology, epistemology, logic, philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, philosophy of science. Yet the existence, nature, and purpose of categories have all been disputed from the beginning. Whether categories divide things, or concepts, or words, or some combination, has never been consensually agreed. It has been doubted whether there is a definitive and absolute collection of categories, or whether they shift over time or vary with language and culture. The lists of categories proposed by different philosophers seem as varied as their modes of dress, and the methods by which they are determined are just as disputed as the contents of these lists. Some indeed deny that there are any categories, or that we can ever know what categories apply to the world, or that we need them in any way at all. Roughly speaking, when it comes to categories, nothing is agreed. This course will introduce the concept of category in its variant historical guises, highlighting prominent accounts from Aristotle to the present, their similarities and differences, but with the emphasis on more modern philosophy. Prominent figures in this story after Aristotle are Ockham, John of St. Thomas, Kant, Brentano, Frege, Husserl, Russell, Whitehead, Ingarden, Williams, Quine, Chisholm, Armstrong and Lowe. We will then move on to consider what categories might be, whether they are words, concepts, classes of things, or indeed more than one of these, jointly or severally.Given the widespread disagreement about what categories are, it is less surprising that there is little agreement as to which categories there are. One problem here is that the methods employed to discern or discover categories have varied widely. They can be broadly divided into linguistic, logical, and scientific in type. Each approach rests on substantive and debatable assumptions, though is not evident that they are mutually exclusive. We shall assess the various heuristics and their justifications. The overall aim however is not to do history of philosophy, but to use the history as a springboard to assess the role and significance of categories in contemporary ontology.

Charlotte Werndl: Philosophy of climate science.

This seminar will provide an introduction into the philosophy of climate science. Topics will include:
-- Values in science and climate science
-- confirmation and simulation in climate science
-- definitions of climate and climate change
-- detection and attribution of climate change.

Christian Piller: Ethics: Theoretical and Applied 

In this course we will discuss the following questions: Are sums of harms and benefits morally significant? Under what circumstances should we use lotteries in the distribution of benefits (or harms)? Is there a solid philosophical basis for wrongful-life lawsuits? What, if any, are our duties of procreation? Can actions be wrong which harm no one? What is the basis of our duties to future generations? These questions all point to a general issue in normative theory which concerns the relationship between facts about what is good for someone and facts about what is good. We will tackle this issue directly and, via the questions mentioned above, indirectly, thereby hoping to make some progress in both theoretical and applied ethics.

Laurenz Hudetz: Theories of collective decision making

The central question of this course is: How can we determine what a group believes or wants based on what the individual members of the group believe or want? This problem or versions of it arise in many contexts and for groups of various kinds and sizes. It concerns the foundations of democracy and welfare economics as well as decision making in small collectives such as committees, juries or working groups.There is a plethora of possible methods of collective decision making, ranging from widely-used majority rules to pathological ones such as dictatorship. However, many of these methods have undesirable properties. So in order to give a satisfactory answer to the question above, one has to come up with a method that satisfies certain desiderata (such as not being dictatorial or preserving rationality). We will see that the task of finding such methods is beset with severe difficulties. Often, one can prove that no method of a certain type satisfies all desiderata. In view of such impossibility theorems important philosophical questions arise: Which desiderata are we ready to give up? Could we avoid impossibility results by devising methods that take into account more information encoded in individual attitudes? Is it realistic that the required additional information is available in practice?
We will focus on the following topics:
1. Preference aggregation
2. Welfare aggregation
3. Judgement aggregation
4. Voting procedures (with special focus on the problem of manipulation by strategic voting)
5. Voting vs deliberation
6. Issues on the way from theory to practice

Charotte Werndl: Colloquium seminar

  • News
    Am: 15.11.2018 // Zeit: 18:30h s.t. - 20:00h // Ort: Hörsaal 207 der Rechtswiss. Fakultät der Universität Salzburg // Churfürststraße 1 // A-5020 Salzburg // (Zugang beschildert)
    Die neunte Tagung der "Salzburger interdisziplinären Diskurse" zum Thema "Kommunikation und Medien zwischen Kulturindustrie, Lebenswelt und Politik" findet am 15./16. November 2018 im Europasaal der Edmundsburg (Mönchsberg 2, Salzburg) statt.
    Tagung zu Übersetzung und Polemik im KunstQuartier // Donnerstag, 15. November, 18:30h ABENDVORTRAG: ULRICH WYSS (Frankfurt am Main): Übersetzen als Polemik – Borchardts Dante // Bergstr. 12a, 1. OG, W&K-Atelier // www.w-k.sbg.ac.at/de/kunstpolemik-polemikkunst
    Florian P. Schiestll hält am 16. November 2018 um 14:00 Uhr im HS 435 der NW-Fakultät einen Gastvortrag zum Thema "Divergent floral evolution driven by pollinators and herbivores". Der Fachbereich Biowissenschaften lädt herzlich dazu ein!
    Rudolf Krska hält am 16. November 2018 um 11:30 Uhr im HS 421 der NW-Fakultät einen Gastvortrag zum Thema "Novel (Integrated) Methods to Control, Detect and Reduce Mycotoxins in Food and Feed". Der Fachbereich Biowissenschaften lädt herzlich dazu ein!
    Es ist wieder so weit, am 17. November 2018 findet das Konzert des Universitätsorchesters für dieses Semester statt.
    Der Fachbereich Psychologie lädt am 17.11.18 zum Fest-Symposium zur 20-jährigen Kooperation der Stadt Salzburg, Senioreneinrichtungen, und der Universität Salzburg, Fachbereich Psychologie, ein.
    Mo. 19.11.2018, 17.15 Uhr, HS E.001 (Unipark) - ao. Univ.-Prof. Dr. Agnethe Siquans (Wien) - Kirchenväter und Judentum
    Herr Dr. Sven Th. Schipporeit (Institut für Klassische Archäologie, Universität Wien) hält zu diesem Thema am Mi, 21. November 2018, 18.30 Uhr, in der Abgusssammlungs SR E.33, Residenzplatz 1, einen Vortrag
    Sebastian Meyer hält am 23. November 2018 um 14:00 Uhr im HS 436 der NW-Fakultät einen Gastvortrag zum Thema "Biodiversity-ecosystem functioning relationships and their drivers in natural and anthropogenic systems with an emphasis on species interactions". Der Fachbereich Biowissenschaften lödt herzlich dazu ein!
    The workshop aims to examine the musicality of the body and vice versa the corporeality of music from a choreographic perspective. This approach corresponds with the extension of the concept of music as well as the questioning of performance traditions in the context of New Music, which also puts a stronger emphasis on the body.
    The relatively young democracy Poland, whose political climate has intensified considerably since the last elections, is also moving increasingly to the fore. Politically critical leaders of representative cultural organisations have been and continue to be replaced by the new administration, while independent creative artists appear to be able to find niches so far or already live outside the country.
    Vom 29.11. bis 01.12.2018 im Unipark Nonntal
    Salzburger Innovationstagung 2018 am 29.11.2018 ab 15 Uhr in der Großen Universitätsaula – ITG, Land Salzburg, Wirtschaftskammer und Salzburger Hochschulkonferenz
    Das Symposion der Katholische-Theologischen Fakultät findet am 29. und 30. November anlässlich der Aufhebung im Jahre 1938 statt. Veranstaltungsort ist der Hörsaal 101 der Theologischen Fakultät, Universitätsplatz 1.
    Am 30. November im Rahmen der Tagung Digital Humanities Austria 2018
    Am 6. Dezember 2018 finden an der Universität Salzburg die WTZ Training Days zum Thema Kommunikation, Dissemination und Verbreitung in H2020-Projekten statt.
  • Veranstaltungen
  • 15.11.18 Übersetzung und Polemik
    15.11.18 Vorträge der Salzburger Juristischen Gesellschaft
    16.11.18 Übersetzung und Polemik
    16.11.18 "Probleme des Vorsteuerabzuges mit Schwerpunkt Umsatzsteuerbetrug"
    17.11.18 "Probleme des Vorsteuerabzuges mit Schwerpunkt Umsatzsteuerbetrug"
    17.11.18 Übersetzung und Polemik
    17.11.18 Konzert des Universitätsorchesters Salzburg
    19.11.18 Medeas furor: Christliche Mythenkritik in Dracontius' Romulea?
    21.11.18 Zeit und Kult in der Gründungsphase der neuen Polis Rhodos
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