Brotkrumenpfad
Forschung am Fachbereich
Forschungsbereiche
Logik und Wissenschaftstheorie
Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie
Evidenz und Philosophie der Statistik
Philosophie der Klimawissenschaften
Philosophische Logik
Philosophie der Physik
Philosophie der Mathematik
Theoretische Philosophie
Sprachphilosophie
Philosophische Logik
Philosophie des Geistes
Ontologie & Metaphysik
Formale Erkenntnistheorie
Praktische Philosophie
Privatheit
Verantwortung
Vorwürfe
Metaethik
Rechte und Gerechtigkeit
Philosophiedidaktik
Reflektierte Wissenschaftsorientierung in philosophischen Bildungsprozessen
Metaphilosophie
Interdisziplinäre Fachdidaktik
Philosophieren mit Kindern
Publikationstätigkeit am Fachbereich seit 2013
- Brandl, J., 2017, Book review: “Aaron Preson: Analytic Philosophy: An Interpretive History”, in: Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (online, Sept. 9, 2017).
- Brandl, J. (with R. McIntyre), 2017: (with R. McIntyre) “Introduction”, Themes from David Woodruff Smith. Special Issue of Grazer Philosophische Studien, 94 (2017), 297–299.
- Brandl, J., 2017, “The problem of understanding social norms and what it would take for a robot to solve it”, in: R. Hakli & J. Seibt (eds.): Sociality and Normativity for Robots. Springer International Publishing, 2017. 201–215.
- Brandl, J., 2017, "Was Brentano an Early Deflationist About Truth?." The Monist 100.1 (2017): 1–14.
- Brandl, J., 2017, Brentano on Truth. In U. Kriegel (ed.): Routledge Handbook of Brentano and the Brentano School. London: Routledge, 2017, 163-168.
- Brandl, J. (with F. Esken), 2016, ‘Selbstbewusstsein in der gegenwartigen Philosophie des Geistes’, Information Philosophie 3, 2016, 18–29.
- Brandl, J., 2016, ‘The Puzzle of Mirror Self-recognition.’ Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 2016, 1–26.
- Brandl, J. (with Esken, Frank ; Priewasser, Beate & Rafetseder, Eva), 2015, Young children’s protest: what it can tell us about early normative understanding. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2015, 14 (4):719–740.
- Brandl, J., 2014, “Die Entwicklung der Autorität der Ersten Person”, Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 62 (5), 937–962.
- Brandl, J., 2013, “Philosophie des Geistes und der Kognition”, in: A. Stephan & S. Walter (Hg.): Handbuch Kognitionswissenschaft. Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler, 127–132.
- Bussmann, B., 2018, “Philosophische Probleme und Interdisziplinarität”. Erscheint in: René Torkler (Hrsg.) Ethik und Bildung. Springer VS, Wiesbaden.
- Bussmann, B., 2017, “Philosophisches Wissen im Philosophieunterricht ja – aber nicht ohne Didaktik. Eine Antwort auf den Vorschlag einer neuen Philosophiedidaktik”. Information Philosophie 2/2017. S. 108-112.B
- Bussmann, B., 2017, “Epistemische Kompetenz in interkulturellen Bildungsprozessen”. Erscheint in: Franz Gmainer-Pranzl/Britta Saal (Hrsg.): Polylog Denken. Überlegungen zu einer interkulturell-philosophischen Minimalregel. Wien, Facultas Verlag, 2017. S. 91-115.
- Bussmann, B., 2017, “Empirisch informiert und experimentell philosophieren” (zusammen mit V. Haase). In: Martens (Hrsg.): Empirie und Erfahrung im Philosophie- und Ethikunterricht. Hannover, Siebert Verlag 2017. S. 13-42.
- Bussmann, B., 2016, “10 Thesen zum kompetenzorientierten Philosophie- und Ethikunterricht”. In: ZDPE 4/16. S. 3.
- Bussmann, B., 2016, “Ist der Naturalismus eine Ideologie?” In: ZDPE 3/16. S. 24-31.
- Bussmann, B., 2016, “Was heißt es, Indoktrination zu vermeiden?” (zusammen mit V. Haase). In: ZDPE 3/16. S. 87-99.
- Bussmann, B., 2016, “Empirisch philosophieren” (zusammen mit V. Haase). In: Information Philosophie 2/16. S. 108-114.
- Bussmann, B., 2016, “Lebenswelt ja – aber wie?”. Erscheint in: ZDPE 1/16.
- Bussmann, B., 2016, “Was die Philosophiedidaktik fur die Schule leistet” (zusammen mit E. Martens). In: Didaktik des Ethik- und Philosophieunterrichts. Cornelsen, Berlin 2016
- Bussmann, B., 2015, “Wissenschaftsorientierung”. In: Handbuch: Philosophie und Lehre. Band 1. Nida-Rumelin, Julian/Tiedemann, Markus/Spiegel, Irina (Hg.). UTB 2015.
- Bussmann, B., 2015, “Liebe”. In: Handbuch: Philosophie und Lehre. Band 2. Nida-Rümelin, Julian/Tiedemann, Markus/Spiegel, Irina (Hg.). UTB 2015.
- Bussmann, B., 2014, Was heißt: sich an der Wissenschaft orientieren? Untersuchungen zu einer lebensweltlich-wissenschaftsbasierten Philosophiedidaktik am Beispiel des Themas ‘Wissenschaft, Esoterik und Pseudowissenschaft’. LIT Verlag, Munster 2014. (= Phil. Diss.).
- Fréchette, G. (Hrsg.), 2015, Brentano’s Concept of Intentionality. New Assessments. Special Issue of Brentano-Studien, vol 13, 260 p.
- Fréchette, G. (Hrsg.), 2015, “Stumpfs ‚Einleitung zu Brentanos Briefen an mich, gefolgt von ausgewählten Briefe von Brentano und Stumpf Carl Stumpf und Franz Brentano” in R. Martinelli and D. Fisette (eds.), Philosophy from an empirical Standpoint, Amsterdam: Rodopi, pp. 491–530.
- Fréchette, G., 2015, “Stumpf on Abstraction” in R. Martinelli and D. Fisette (eds.), Philosophy from an empirical Standpoint, Amsterdam: Rodopi, 263–292.
- Fréchette, G., 2015, “Brentano’s Conception of Intentionality. New Facts and Unsettled Issues” in G. Fréchette (Ed.), Brentano’s Conception of Intentionality. New Assessments, vol. 13 of Brentano-Studien, p. 11–24.
- Fréchette, G., 2015, “Essential Laws” in B. Leclercq, S. Richard and D. Seron (Ed.), Objects and Pseudo-Objects: Ontological Deserts and Jungle from Brentano to Carnap, Berlin, De Gruyter, p. 143–166.
- Fréchette, G., 2014, “L’intentionnalité dans la théorie de la science de Bolzano. Éléments d’une reconstruction”, in Methodos, vol. 14.
- Fréchette, G., 2014, “ De l’intentionnalité à la théorie de l’objet. Meinong, son école, ses critiques ” in C. Niveleau (Ed.) Vers une philosophie scientifique : le programme de Brentano, Paris, Demopolis, pp. 187–214.
- Fréchette, G., 2014, “Fixer, déterminer, interpréter. Éléments de psychologie descriptive de Brentano à Marty” in L. Cesalli und J. Friedrich (Ed.), Marty et Bühler. Philosophes du langage, Basel, Schwabe, p. 79–101.
- Fréchette, G., 2014, “Austrian Logical Realism? Brentano on States of Affairs ”, in G. Bonino, J. Cumpa, G. Jesson (Ed.), Defending Realism, Berlin, De Gruyter, p. 379-400.
- Fréchette, G., 2014, “Wittgenstein et la philosophie austro-allemande (K. Mulligan)”, in Studia Philosophica, vol. 73, pp. 253–256.
- Fréchette, G., 2014, “ ‘Intentionality’, Munich, Philosophia, 2012 (A. Salice, ed.)” in Husserl Studies, vol. 30, no. 3 (Oct. 2014).
- Fréchette, G., 2013, “Searching for the Self. Early Phenomenological Accounts of Self-Consciousness from Lotze to Scheler ”, International Journal of Philosophical Studies, vol. 21, no. 5, p. 654–679.
- Fréchette, G. (Hrsg.), 2013, Themes from Brentano, Amsterdam/New York, Rodopi, 532p. (with D. Fisette).
- Fréchette, G., 2013, “Brentano’s Thesis (Revisited) ”, in D. Fisette, G. Fréchette (Ed.), Themes from Brentano, Rodopi, p. 101–129.
- Fréchette, G., 2013, “Varieties of Intentionality: Introduction ”, in D. Fisette, G. Fréchette (Ed.), Themes from Brentano, Rodopi, p. 87–90.
- Fréchette, G., 2013, “Introduction: Brentano’s Impact”, in D. Fisette, G. Fréchette (Ed.), Themes from Brentano, Rodopi, p. 9–16.
- Fréchette, G., 2013, “Editorial Remarks [On Abstraction and Relation]”, in D. Fisette, G. Fréchette (Ed.), Themes from Brentano, Rodopi, p. 421–430.
- Fréchette, G., 2013, “Ontology and Metaphysics: Introduction ”, in D. Fisette, G. Fréchette (Ed.), Themes from Brentano, Rodopi, p. 189–192.
- Fréchette, G., 2013, “Kant, Brentano and Stumpf on Psychology and Anti-Psychologism”, in S. Bacin, A. Ferrarin, C. La Rocca and M. Ruffing (Ed.) Kant and Philosophy in a Cosmopolitical Sense, Berlin, De Gruyter, p. 739–748.
- Gauker, Ch., forthcoming, “Grounding Assertion and Acceptance in Mental Imagery”, in Ondrej Beran, Vojtech Kolman, Ladislav Koren, eds., From rules to meanings. New essays on inferentialism, Routledge.
- Gauker, Ch., forthcoming, “Do Perceptions Justify Beliefs? The Argument from ‘Looks’”, in J. Gersel, R. T. Jensen, M. S. Thaning and S. Overgaard, eds., In Light of Experience: Essays on Reason and Perception, Oxford University Press.
- Gauker, Ch., forthcoming, “Presuppositions as Anaphoric Duality Enablers”, Topoi (special issue on Presuppositions, edited by Filippo Domaneschi).
- Gauker, Ch., forthcoming, “Condillac,” in Benjamin Hill, Henrik Lagerlund and Robert J. Stainton, eds., Sourcebook in the History of Philosophy of Language. Springer.
- Gauker, Ch., 2017, “Open Texture and Schematicity as Arguments for Non-referential Semantics”, in Sarah-Jane Conrad and Klaus Petrus, eds., Meaning, Context, and Methodology, De Gruyter Mouton, 2017, pp. 13–30.
- Gauker, Ch., 2017, “Metacognitive Deficits in Categorization Tasks in a Population with Impaired Inner Speech” (as second author, after Peter Langland-Hassan, along with Michael J. Richardson, Aimee Dietz, and Frank R. Faries), Acta Psychologica, 118 (2017): 62–74.
- Gauker, Ch., 2017, “Visual Imagery in the Thought of Monkeys and Apes”, in Jacob Beck and Kristin Andrews, eds., Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Animal Minds, Routledge, 2017, pp. 25–33.
- Gauker, Ch., 2017, “The Mind-Independence of Contexts for Knowledge-Attributions” (as second author, with Giovanni Mion as first author), in Jonathan Ichikawa, ed., Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism, Routledge, 2017, pp. 455–46.
- Gauker, Ch., 2017, “Three Kinds of Nonconceptual Seeing-As”, Review of Philosophy and Psychology (special issue edited by Robyn Carston and Kepa Korta) 8 (2017): 763–779.
- Gauker, Ch., 2017, “Presuppositions as Anaphoric Duality Enablers”, Topoi 35 (2016): 133–144. (Special issue on presuppositions, edited by Filippo Domaneschi.)
- Interview of Christopher Gauker, conducted by Bruno Mölder and published in Estonian translation in Vikerkaar Kultuuriajakiri 3, 2015: 75-80, 90-92.
- Gauker, Ch., 2015, “How Many Bare Demonstratives are There in English?”, Linguistics and Philosophy 37: 291–314.
- Gauker, Ch., 2015, “Précis of Words and Images”, Analysis 75: 81–83.
- Gauker, Ch., 2015, “Replies to Matthen, Weiskopf and Wikforss”, Analysis 75: 121–131.
- Gauker, Ch., 2015, “The Illusion of Semantic Reference”, in Andrea Bianchi, ed., On Reference, Oxford University Press, pp. 21–39.
- Gauker, Ch., 2013, “Inexplicit Thoughts,” in Laurence Goldstein, ed., Brevity, Oxford University Press, pp. 74–90.
- Gauker, Ch., 2013, “Logical Nihilism in Contemporary French Philosophy,” Teorema (Spanish) 32: 65-79.
- Gauker, Ch., 2013, Review of Christoph Hoerl, Teresa McCormack and Sarah Beck, Understanding Counterfactuals, Understanding Causation, Mind 122: 540–544.
Hudetz, L., 2017, “The sementic view of theories and higher-order languages”. Synthese. - Hudetz, .L., 2015: “Linear structures, causal sets and topology”, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Volume 52, Part B, 294–308.
- Murzi, J. (with L. Rossi), [forthcoming] “Reflection Principles an the Liar in Context”, in Philosophers’ Imprint.
- Murzi, J., “Naive validity” (with L. Rossi), [forthcoming], in Synthese.
- Murzi, J., Special issue of Logique et Analyse on Reasoning (co-ed with J. P. van Bendegem), [forthcoming], The issue will contain a selection of papers presented at the Reasoning Club Conference, held in Brussels on September 17-9, 2012. Contributors: Martin Adamcik and George Wilmers, Harmen Ghijsen, Yacin Hamami, Ruth Hibbert, Liz Horwath, Malte Kliess, Hans-Christoph Kotzsch, Tahel Ronel, Jan de Winter and Lazlo Kosolosky.
- Murzi, J., 2017 (with F. Steinberger), ‘Inferential Role Semantics’, in A Companion to the Philosophy of Language, Second Edition, Basil Blackwell, B. Hale, A. Miller and C. Wright (eds), pp. 197-224.
- Murzi, J., 2017, [with Luca Incurvati], “Maximally Consistent Sets of Instances of Naive Comprehension” in Mind 126, 371–384.
- Murzi, J., 2015, “Validity and Truth-Preservation” (with L. Shapiro), in Unifying the Philosophy of Truth (D. Achourioti, K. Fujimoto, H. Galinon, J. Martinez, eds), Springer, pp. 431–460.
- Murzi, J., 2015, “Denial and Disagreement” (with M. Carrara), Topoi 34, pp. 109–119.
- Murzi, J., 2015, “Paradox and Logical Revision” (with M. Carrara), Topoi 34, pp. 7–14.
- Murzi, J., 2014, New Essays on Logical Consequence, Logique et Analyse 227, pp. 223–486. Special issue co-edited with M. Carrara. The topic of this special issue is logical consequence, broadly construed, but with a particular focus on conceptions of logical consequence for non-classical logics. Contributors: Corine Besson, Massimiliano Carrara, Marcello D'Agostino, Ole T. Hjortland, Enrico Martino, Toby Meadows, Vittorio Morato, Julien Murzi, Francesco Paoli, Gil Sagi and Jack Woods.
- Murzi, J., 2014, “More Reflections on Consequence” (with M. Carrara), Logique et Analyse 227, pp. 223–258.
- Murzi, J., 2014, “The Inexpressibility of Validity”, Analysis 74(1), pp. 65–81.
- Murzi, J., 2013, “Is Knowledge of Logic Dispositional?” (with F. Steinberger), Philosophical Studies 166(1), pp. 165–183.
- Murzi, J., 2013, “Two Flavours of Curry’s Paradox” (with Jc Beall), The Journal of Philosophy CX(3), pp. 143–65.
- Murzi, J., 2013, “Coming True: A Note on Truth and Actuality” (with Richard Dietz), Philosophical Studies 163(2), pp. 403–427.
- Werndl, C. (forthcoming) [with R. Frigg, but Werndl is first author]. 'When Does a Boltzmannian Equilibrium Exist?'. In: D. Bendingham, O. Maroney and C. Timpson (eds), Quantum Foundations of Statistical Mechanics. Oxford University Press. [working paper].
- Werndl, C. (forthcoming) [with R. Frigg, but Werndl is first author], 'Mind the Gap: Boltzmannian versus Gibbsian Equilibrium'. Philosophy of Science. Working paper.
- Werndl, C. (forthcoming), Initial Conditions Dependence and Initial Conditions Uncertainty in Climate Science. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
- Werndl, C. (forthcoming) [with R. Frigg], 'Rethinking Boltzmannian Equilibrium'. Philosophy of Science.
- Werndl, C., 2017 [with R. Bradley, R. Frigg, K. Steele and E. Thompson], 'Philosophie der Klimawissenschaften'. In: T. Reydons and S. Lohse (eds), Die Philosophie der Einzelwissenschaften. Meiner Verlag [working paper].
- Werndl, C., 2017 [with R. Frigg, but Werndl is first author], 'Bolzmannian Equilibrium in Stochastic Systems'. In: M. Massimi and van Romejin, J.-W. (eds), Duesseldorf 2015: The European Philosophy of Science Association Proeceedings. [working paper, link to book].
- Werndl, C., 2016, 'Model Selection Theory. The Need for a More Nuanced Picture of Double-Counting and Use-Novelty'. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, doi.org/10.1093/bjps/axw024. [full article].
- Werndl, C., 2016 [with K. Steele], 'The Diversity of Model Tuning Practices in Climate Science'. Philosophy of Science 83 (5), 1133-1144 [full article, working paper].
- Werndl, C., 2016, 'On Defining Climate and Climate Change'. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (2), 337-364. [full article, working paper]
- Werndl, C., 2015, ‘Philosophy of Climate Science, Part I: Observing Climate Change’, Philosophy Compass 10/12, 953–964 [gemeinsam mit Roman Frigg, Erica Thompson].
- Werndl, C., 2015, ‘Philosophy of Climate Science, Part II: Modelling Climate Change’, Philosophy Compass 10/12, 965–977 [gemeinsam mit Roman Frigg, Erica Thompson].
- Werndl, C., 2015, ‘Determinism and Indeterminism'. In: P. Humphreys, (ed), Oxford Handbook for the Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Werndl, C., 2015, ‘Introduction to Philosophy of Climate Science, Part 1: Observing Climate Change’. Philosophy Compass [with R. Frigg and E. Thompson].
- Werndl, C., 2015, ‘Introduction to Philosophy of Climate Science, Part 2: Modelling Climate Change’. Philosophy Compass [with R. Frigg and E. Thompson].
- Werndl, C., 2015, ‘Reconceptionalising Equilibrium in Boltzmannian Statistical Mechanics’. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 49, 19–31. [with R. Frigg as secound author].
- Werndl, C., 2015, ‘Model tuning in engineering: uncovering the logic’. The Journal of Strain Analysis for Engineering Design, with K. Steele, doi: 10.1177/0309324715575445.
- Werndl, C., 2013, ‘Justifying Typicality Measures of Boltzmannian Statistical Mechanics and Dynamical Systems’. Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 44 (4), 470-479.
- Werndl, C., 2013, 'Climate Models, Confirmation and Calibration'. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64, 609–635 [with K. Steele].
- Werndl, C., 2013, ‘On Choosing Between Deterministic and Indeterministic Models: Underdetermination and Indirect Evidence’. Synthese 190 (12), 2243–2265.
- Werndl, C., 2013, ‘Do Microbes Question Standard Thinking in the Philosophy of Biology?’ Critical Notice of "Processes of Life -- Essays in the Philosophy of Biology" (John Dupre). Analysis 73 (2), 380–387.
- Werndl, C., 2013, ‘Are All Probabilities in Statistical Mechanics Transition Probabilities?’
Review of “The Road to Maxwelll's Demon -- Conceptual Foundations of Statistical Mechanics” (Meir Hemmo and Orly Shenker). Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
